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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the age of  a democracy matters when explaining voter turnout. It proposes that democratic matu-
rity might influence the probability of  casting a ballot not only directly, but at the same time, as an amplifier of  the effects 
of  individual-level predictors of  voting. From an array of  variables that might be responsible for raising or lowering one’s 
probability of  voting, this study emphasizes that the impact of  a sense of  external efficacy can be contingent on the different 
levels of  democratic age. Theoretically, the ties between democratic maturity and external efficacy in turnout explanation 
follow from aspects of  political socialization process. We hypothesize that the higher the democratic age, the higher the po-
sitive effect of  external efficacy on participation in elections. This supposition is tested through an empirical analysis based 
on survey data from the third module of  the Comparative Study of  Electoral Systems (CSES). In total, the dataset comprises 
34,440 respondents nested in 27 countries. Multilevel logistic regression that includes cross-level interaction is employed to 
estimate the effects of  the variables of  interest on self-reported turnout.
Keywords:
voter turnout, democratic maturity, external efficacy, multilevel modeling, cross-level interaction 
Demokratische Reife, externe Wirksamkeit und Wahlbeteiligung
Zusammenfassung: 
Dieser Artikel analysiert die Bedeutung des Alters einer Demokratie für die Erklärung von Wahlbeteiligung. Er schlägt vor, 
dass die demokratische Reife die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Stimmangabe nicht nur direkt beeinflussen könnte, sondern zu-
gleich auch als Verstärker der Effekte von Prädiktoren auf  der Individual-Ebene. Aus der Bandbreite der Variablen, die für 
eine Erhöhung oder Verringerung der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Stimmabgabe verantwortlich sein könnten, hebt diese Studie 
hervor, dass das politische Responsivitätsgefühl (externe Wirksamkeit) vom Alter einer Demokratie abhängen könnte. Der 
Zusammenhang zwischen demokratischer Reife und externer Wirksamkeit für die Erklärung von Wahlbeteiligung lässt sich 
theoretisch aus Aspekten des politischen Sozialisationsprozesses herleiten. Unsere Hypothese ist, dass mit steigendem De-
mokratiealter auch die positiven Effekte externer Wirksamkeit auf  die Wahlbeteiligung zunehmen. Diese Vermutung wird 
mittels einer empirischen Analyse getestet, die auf  Survey-Daten aus dem dritten Modul der Comparative Study of  Electoral 
Systems (CSES) zurückgreift. Das Daten-Set besteht aus insgesamt 34.440 Befragten in 27 Ländern. Es wird eine logistische 
Regression verwendet (Mehrebenen-Analyse inklusive Interaktions-Analyse), um die Wirkung der uns interessierenden Va-
riablen auf  die Wahlbeteiligung (nach den Angaben der Befragten) abzuschätzen.
Schlüsselwörter:
Wahlbeteiligung, demokratische Reife, externe Wirksamkeit, Mehrebenen-Modellierung, Mehrebenen-Interaktion 
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1. Introduction
In the past ten or fifteen years, there has been a growing 
discussion asserting that political participation is not the 
result of  personal characteristics or political context, but 
that it is the result of  interactions between both types of  
factors (e.g. Platt 2008: 392). Following this statement, a 
stream of  papers that introduces possibilities for bridg-
ing macro- and micro-level predictors of  voter turnout has 
emerged (Andiuza Perea 2002; Jusko/Shively 2005; Field-
house et al. 2007; Anderson 2007; Gallego 2010; Rocha et al. 
2010; Quintelier et al. 2010; Dalton/Anderson 2011; Kittil-
son/Anderson 2011; Singh 2011; Söderlund et al. 2011). This 
type of  work has repeatedly shown that contextual factors 
may substantially enrich individual-level explanations for 
why people vote not only by the inclusion of  their direct ef-
fects on voting propensity, but also by so-called contingent 
effects (see below; Brambor/Clark/Golder 2006). 
Not surprisingly, there are still several context-level 
forces whose impacts have not been sufficiently examined. 
From an array of  these overlooked factors, we have chosen 
for further investigation the nature of  democracy, where 
citizens make a decision about whether to cast a ballot. The 
reason for this choice is simple. There is a “conventional” 
individual-level turnout explanation, which was developed 
and rather successfully utilized in long-established de-
mocracies, in particular, in the United States (Campbell et 
al. 1954; 1960; Verba et al. 1995; Rosenstone/Hansen 2003). 
However, there are also those democracies that have gone 
through the process of  democratic transition only a few 
years ago. In these societies, living under authoritarian rule 
has shaped people’s everyday experiences, and to a certain 
extent, such historical legacy may more or less affect the 
(different) functioning of  conventional determinants of  
voter turnout (cf. Bernhagen/Marsh 2007; Kostadinova 
2009). Hence, it would appear that some difference in the 
impact of  the explanatory variables caused by democratic 
maturity might exist.
Accordingly, one might assume that there could be a 
contingent effect of  democratic age, which should be mani-
fested by the non-uniform size of  the impact of  some vari-
ables that explain probability of  voting at the individual 
level. This study stresses that the effect of  a sense of  politi-
cal efficacy (more precisely, its external dimension) should 
be moderated by the maturity of  a democracy. Political ef-
ficacy is often described as a long-term attitude acquired in 
the process of  political socialization, which is based on the 
feeling that ordinary people are capable of  influencing the 
democratic process (see Campbell et al. 1954; Easton/Den-
nis 1967; Iyengar 1980; Pasek et al. 2008; cf. McPherson et 
al. 1977). 
In established democracies, as we would expect, there 
are experienced agents of  political socialization and the 
atmosphere is more favorable to values congruent with 
democracy. People learn to believe that their political en-
gagement can foster change, and thus, those who are 
politically effective should vote much more than oth-
ers. In contrast, many citizens in emerging democra-
cies have been socialized into non-democratic values 
and they are hardly able to develop basic orientations 
and practices in those who are in their formative 
years (Sapiro 2004). Therefore, the impact of  politi-
cal efficacy on probability of  voting in these countries 
should be small or none.
Simply put, the main objective of  this study is to 
search for empirical support for the macro-micro in-
terconnection between two factors that explain voter 
turnout, democratic age, and external efficacy, utiliz-
ing some important aspects of  the political socializa-
tion process as a mechanism that might bridge the 
individual and contextual levels of  the analysis. The 
paper addresses this issue by using multilevel mod-
els that include cross-level interaction. The empirical 
analysis below uses data from the third module of  
the Comparative Study of  Electoral Systems. In total, 
34,440 respondents from 27 countries are included. 
2. How democratic maturity matters
It is often emphasized that well-designed democratic 
institutions are a necessary, but not sufficient condi-
tion for a vital democracy. For the smooth running of  
a political system, democratic citizens who lend sup-
port to a regime are also required (e.g. Easton 1957). 
Regarding the debates about the requirements of  a 
stable democracy, Almond and Verba’s seminal study 
entitled The Civic Culture can be considered one of  the 
most influential works in this field of  research (Al-
mond/Verba 1963). The major conclusion of  this study, 
namely that citizens’ psychological orientations to 
the political institutions congruent with democratic 
principles are crucial for the durability and success-
ful persistence of  a democracy, sounds persuasive, 
and this paper does not attempt to challenge the idea 
that a political regime must be not only legal, but also 
legitimate for its maintenance.
At the same time, however, it is clear that “good” 
democratic citizens are made, not born (Gastil 2001). 
In a stable democracy, then, attitudes toward a politi-
cal system (and its various parts) and toward the self  
in the system, jointly called political culture, must 
be inculcated by the various agents of  a democratic 
political system. And it is noteworthy that the pro-
cess of  political socialization, in which the individu-
als develop basic orientations and practices for their 
future political life, is not identical in all countries.1 
1 Political socialization can be defined as a training process media-
ted through socialization agents leading to the development 
of  a political culture that may allow democratic institutions to 
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In different contexts, socialization agents disseminate 
different messages about citizenship to those who are 
learning to contribute support to a regime (Sapiro 2004; 
Gimpel et al. 2003; Pacecho 2008). 
Thus, while Almond and Verba’s study (1963) has 
underlined that an adequate set of  political orientations 
fosters democratic stability, there are other scholars 
who anticipate that the relationship between attitudi-
nal variables and the viability of  a democracy lies rath-
er in the expectation that the long-term functioning of  
democratic institutions should, through various “pro-
moters” of  a democracy, gradually produce a democrat-
ic political culture (Barry 1978; Muller/Seligson 1994; 
Mishler/Rose 2001). As a logical consequence, one can 
assume that the relationship between civic orientations 
and democratic age might be reciprocal. In Eastonian 
terms, on the one hand, a political system needs support 
for its maintenance, but at the same time, it is capable 
to generate and accumulate a strong reserve of  support 
(see Easton 1957).
The common denominator in both views on the di-
rection of  the relationship between civic values and 
democratic age resides in political socialization and 
the agents responsible for the success of  this process. 
Reference to the forces from individuals’ surroundings, 
such as family, peer groups, mass media, and schools, 
implies that there are different levels of  the context in 
which people in their formative years acquire the norms 
and behavior supportive of  a political regime. 
However, the basic question concerns what level of  
context is the most important for the success of  political 
socialization. When forming an opinion on this issue, it 
is important to point out that all of  these forces find the 
basis for their influence at the level of  a political sys-
tem. To be more concrete, family members and peers, 
as well as media workers, are educated in schools. And 
since education is provided and funded by the public 
sector to a large extent, states have the main say in what 
the pupils will learn and what kind of  teachers will give 
the lessons.2 Hence, the nature of  political socialization 
that may lead to the absorption of  “proper” political at-
titudes and practices should depend primarily on what 
is going on in the national political arena. Due to the 
pivotal role of  schooling, the lower levels of  the context 
in which individuals are nested (groups, households 
etc.) are substantially affected by the national level (cf. 
Gimpel et al. 2003; Pacheco 2008; Almond/Verba 1963).3
function (cf. Hyman 1959; Easton/Dennis 1967; Sigel 1970; Shapiro 
2004; Franklin 2004; Jennings 2007; see also Janák/Klobucký 
2014a; 2014b).
2 For justifying the crucial role of  schooling in the process of  political 
socialization, see e.g. Gastil (2001) or Pasek et al. (2008).
3 We admit that this argument may be controversial in several 
aspects. Above all, there are studies that emphasize the lower levels 
of  context pivotal for political socialization. Further, for some other 
authors, the process of  political socialization is rooted not only in 
One might reasonably believe that the most success-
ful transmission of  democratic norms will be typical for 
political regimes in which the vast majority of  citizens 
was socialized in a democratic milieu. When a democ-
racy is genuinely old, socialization agents are highly ex-
perienced and a democratic polity is for them “the only 
game in town.” On the other hand, in emerging democ-
racies, some proportion of  these agents has grown up in 
an atmosphere of  non-democratic values and the chance 
that they will be successful in the political socialization 
process is not as high as in long-established democracies 
(see Shapiro 2004).
Since there are certain arguments asserting that the 
degree of  the successful instilling of  proper (1) civic val-
ues and (2) behavior might depend on democratic ma-
turity, we expect that there should be two distinct in-
fluences of  democratic age that can be described as its 
direct and contingent effects. When focusing on the first, 
democratic age may directly affect the propensity of  
voting. Given the experience of  socialization agents in 
mature democracies, it is reasonable to assume that vot-
ing in these countries will be perceived as a norm, and 
people will exert great social pressure for participation 
in elections. Therefore, the higher the democratic age, 
the higher the probability of  voting should be. 
To this, we must add that the association between the 
character of  a democracy and the percentage of  people 
that vote cannot be regarded as something novel (see 
Norris 2002; Blais/Dobrzynska 1998; Endersby/Krieck-
haus 2008; Söderlund et al. 2011). In previous research, 
however, the direct impact of  democratic maturity on 
voter turnout has often been reduced to a description of  
turnout differences between so-called “old” and “new” 
democracies (e.g. Bernhagen/Marsh 2007; Karp/Ban-
ducci 2007; Nový 2013; see also Franklin 2004). At the 
same time, the entrance to the club of  old democracies 
has been usually guaranteed after twenty years of  con-
tinuous functioning of  the democratic process in a given 
country (Nohlen 2002; Karp/Banducci 2007). 
For us, the old/new dichotomy appears a little out-
moded. To demonstrate its disappointing nature, we 
turn our attention to three southern European, post-au-
thoritarian countries – Spain, Portugal, and Greece. De-
spite having undergone the process of  democratic tran-
sition in the late 1970s, these countries can be considered 
rightful members of  the group of  old democracies, side 
by side with countries such as the United States, in which 
democracy was established more than two hundred 
years ago. At present, post-communist countries have 
also fulfilled the condition of  being democratic for more 
than twenty years, and therefore, they have become old-
er, albeit the politics in these units diametrically differs 
the formal (manifest) influence of  socialization agents, but also in 
the unintentional transmission of  values (for example, what the 
individual hears in the family in ordinary talk, etc.).
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from that in the traditional core of  Western democracies 
(Rose 2009; Pacek et al. 2009; Pop-Eleches/Tucker 2011; 
2014; Kostadinova 2003).
In this paper, we attempt to overcome this difficul-
ty in the way that democratic maturity is perceived by 
treating it as a continuous variable indicating how many 
years of  uninterrupted functioning of  democratic rule 
has passed through the election under analysis. We in-
troduce the operationalization of  this variable in more 
detail in the next section. 
As noted above, aside from its direct impact on voter 
turnout, democratic maturity may also have a contin-
gent effect. This study anticipates that the age of  a de-
mocracy may function as an “amplifier” of  the impact 
of  some individual-level variables on voting propensity. 
We hypothesize that in the first place, the moderating 
influence of  democratic age should relate to a sense of  
political efficacy, or more precisely, to an external di-
mension of  this sense (see Hadjar/Beck 2010). 
A sense of  external efficacy has been chosen because 
it is often perceived as developed during the formative 
years in which the openness to stimuli from political 
socialization agents is the highest (Easton/Dennis 1967; 
Pasek et al. 2008; cf. McPherson et al. 1977). In addition, 
some authors do not hesitate to place external efficacy 
among the indicators of  support for a political system 
(e.g. Iyengar 1980; Norris et al. 2005), and thus, it ap-
pears very closely related to the issue of  how to provide 
democratic stability. 
Generally speaking, political efficacy refers to “the 
feeling that individual political action does have, or can 
have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is 
worth while to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feel-
ing that political and social change is possible, and that 
the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about 
this change.” (Campbell et al. 1954: 187) But as indicated 
previously, political efficacy does not seem to be a unidi-
mensional concept. It is usually considered to have two 
components, external and internal (Balch 1974; Converse 
1972). While internal efficacy relates to beliefs about an 
individual’s competence to understand politics and par-
ticipate effectively in political life, external efficacy in-
volves beliefs about how responsive the government is 
to citizens’ needs and demands. 
The direct impact of  a sense of  external efficacy on 
participation in elections has been commonly studied in 
the literature on political behavior (Campbell et al. 1954; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Verba/Nie 1972; Abramson/Aldrich 
1982; Pollock 1983; Verba et al. 1995; Rosenstone/Hansen 
2003; Norris 2004 etc.). The association between exter-
nal efficacy and probability of  voting is expected to be 
positive. This is because citizens with a greater sense of  
efficacy may think, despite the fact that electorates usu-
ally comprise millions of  people, that their political ac-
tion has a substantive effect on political outcomes, and 
thus, they are more likely to turn out than those with a 
lower sense of  efficacy. 
On the other hand, the contingent effect of  demo-
cratic age on external efficacy, which may cause the size 
of  the effect of  efficacy on voting propensity to be dif-
ferent across countries, has largely not been discussed 
by scholars. Considering the arguments raised above, we 
hypothesize that increasing democratic maturity will 
strengthen the positive impact of  external efficacy on 
the probability of  casting a ballot. In other words, due 
to differences in the nature of  political socialization, the 
highly positive and significant effect of  external efficacy 
should be typical of  long-established democracies.4 In 
contrast, in newer democracies, the factors related to an 
authoritarian legacy, in particular, the lack of  experi-
enced socialization agents, might decrease the relevance 
of  a “conventional” explanation of  electoral participa-
tion that includes a sense of  external efficacy (cf. Kosta-
dinova 2009). Therefore, the impact of  external efficacy 
should not be statistically significant in countries where 
the democracy is just developing.
3. Micro- and macro-level controls
The literature on political participation refers to an ex-
tensive set of  factors that can affect voter turnout (see 
Smets/van Ham 2013; Geys 2006; Leighley/Nagler 1992; 
Bühlmann/Freitag 2006). Here we address the impact of  
a sense of  external efficacy and democratic age, stress-
ing that these two variables may influence individual-
level turnout not only separately, but also jointly. In the 
models, however, it is necessary to control for the effects 
of  some other micro- and macro-level characteristics 
perceived to be important for the decision of  whether to 
vote.5 At the individual level, the so-called Civic Volun-
tarism Model (CVM) may represent a useful theoretical 
framework for explaining electoral participation (Verba 
et al. 1995). The CVM posits that people are politically 
active because (1) they can, (2) they want to, and/or (3) 
someone has asked them (for more detail, see also Norris 
4 Many seminal studies that have elaborated the most influential 
theoretical models of  political participation (e.g. the Civic 
Voluntarism Model) usually reflect the situation in consolidated 
democratic regimes such as the United States (Verba et al. 1995; 
Rosenstone/Hansen 2003 etc.). But why should these models 
function identically in different contexts? 
5 It is necessary to add that we do not have enough space to describe all 
control variables in detail. The impact of  some variables discussed 
in this section, in particular those from the macro level, is often 
perceived to be ambiguous (see e.g. Norris 2002; Blais/Dobrzynska 
1998; Geys 2006). At the same time, we must stress that our control 
variables are not able to exhaust the field of  the research to a 
maximum extent, and many significant relationships may remain 
omitted. (At the individual level, we are limited by the content of  the 
CSES surveys; at the contextual level, we are forced to minimize the 
number of  explanatory variables because of  the small number of  
the contexts.)
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2002; Dalton 2014). In turn, three main groups of  factors 
influence the decision to participate: personal resources 
(the predispositions determined by position in social 
structure), subjective motivation (i.e. political attitudes), 
and mobilization (the degree of  social integration). 
First, participation in politics places demands on 
people’s scarce resources. Voting has a price, and those 
with a greater capacity to bear it are more likely to visit a 
polling place. In this study, age and education are includ-
ed as explanatory variables. Age refers to the amount of  
experience of  an individual. Older citizens should vote 
in higher proportions because they are established in 
their communities and they usually show a greater fa-
miliarity with the electoral process and public policy 
problems. Education may be regarded as a measure of  
cognitive skills that make voting easier. Schooling in-
creases one’s capacity for understanding and working 
with the complex and abstract issues common in politics 
(Wolfinger/Rosenstone 1980; Norris 2002). 
However, although some people have leisure time, 
skills, and other resources, they simply do not want to 
participate. This is why the second component of  the 
CVM highlights the necessity of  subjective motivation 
to vote. It concerns the impact of  various political atti-
tudes on the probability of  voting. Besides the sense of  
external efficacy discussed above, the paper examines 
the influence of  three additional psychological orien-
tations: party identification, satisfaction with a democ-
racy, and campaign involvement. Party identification 
can be described as the long-term affective attachment 
to a certain political party acquired at an early age (e.g. 
Campbell et al. 1960; Crewe 1976; Heath 2007). Those 
who are emotionally close to some political party have 
a strong incentive to support it on Election Day, and 
therefore, they are more likely to vote than people lack-
ing identification. Satisfaction with a democracy con-
cerns the subjective evaluation of  how well the politi-
cal system works. People who are discontent with a de-
mocracy should abstain more often than their satisfied 
counterparts. We expect such an impact because dissat-
isfied citizens may be less prone to express loyalty to the 
political regime through conventional forms of  political 
action such as voting (Grönlund/Satälä 2007; cf. Hadjar/
Beck 2010). We also control for the impact of  campaign 
involvement, anticipating that citizens who followed an 
election campaign closely are more likely to vote than 
those who did not (see Campbell et al. 1960).   
The last pillar of  the CVM provides an additional lay-
er of  complexity by employing the degree of  social inte-
gration as a factor that may affect the probability of  vot-
ing. People who are mobilized by various political agents 
(in particular, political parties and candidates) and/or 
who are connected to some groups, organizations, and 
social networks (union members, churches, etc.) are 
more stimulated to be politically active. The analysis be-
low focuses on the impact of  two variables, i.e. marital 
status and union membership. Marriage may be benefi-
cial for turnout because a spouse can act as another mo-
bilization agent who discusses politics in the household, 
provides information about elections, and motivates his 
or her wife or husband to take part at the polls. In a simi-
lar fashion, union membership exposes people who are 
attached to employee associations to various political 
stimuli (through meetings, discussions, special events, 
etc.) that increase the probability of  participation in 
elections (Rosenstone/Hansen 2003).
In addition to the CVM, our models also contain a 
variable that reports whether a respondent has voted in 
previous elections. This variable can be regarded as the 
factor that measures so-called habitual voting. For many 
people, participation in elections becomes a habit that 
is repeated as a response to a certain stimulus – i.e. the 
coming of  Election Day – on a regular basis (e.g. Green/
Shachar 2000; Aldrich et al. 2011). Simply put, someone 
who once voted is more prone to do it again.
As noted earlier, at the contextual level, democratic 
age is central to our interest. However, there are some 
other macro-level forces that may affect voter turnout. 
In this study, we use five context-level controls: electoral 
salience, compulsory voting, closeness of  election (i.e. 
margin of  victory), proportional electoral system, and 
the logarithm of  GDP per capita. The first four reflect the 
influence of  political institutions. In brief, electoral sali-
ence indicates how important a given election is for the 
future of  a country, or in other words, what is at stake. 
Not surprisingly, in a parliamentary regime, the most 
salient are parliamentary elections, while in presiden-
tial regimes, presidential elections play a crucial role. 
It is thus expected that the more decisive the elections 
are, the higher the turnout should be (Reif/Schmitt 1980; 
Blais/Dobrzynska 1998, etc.). Compulsory voting may 
also cause a significant increase in the level of  voter 
turnout. If  there is the threat to be fined for abstention, 
the cost of  non-voting becomes higher than the cost of  
voting, and therefore, people have a strong incentive to 
go to the polls (Panagopoulos 2008; Birch 2009).
Closeness of  elections shows how competitive a giv-
en electoral race is. It is usually measured as the margin 
of  victory, i.e. the difference in vote shares between the 
political party that occupies first place in terms of  the 
number of  votes and the second strongest party. If  every 
single vote may cause a change in who wins the race and 
the winner is uncertain until the last moment, the prob-
ability of  casting a decisive vote is relatively high; hence, 
people vote more frequently than in the situation when 
there is a substantial margin between the first and sec-
ond party (Matsusaka 1993; cf. Cox/Munger 1989). Final-
ly, it is often highlighted that the electoral formula may 
influence the willingness to vote. The conventional wis-
dom is that proportional representation (PR) systems 
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generate higher rates of  voter participation than ma-
joritarian (and other) systems (see Norris 2002; Blais/
Dobrzynska 1998). This is because under proportional 
systems, most parties have a chance to win at least one 
seat; therefore, citizens – in particular those who prefer 
smaller parties – do not have to be fearful that their vote 
will be wasted. Thus, the opportunity to vote sincerely is 
the main element that may encourage people to turn out 
(Jackman/Miller 2004; Ladner/Milner 1999). 
The final context-level variable gauges the level 
of  socioeconomic development in a country. Citizens 
in more affluent societies usually enjoy more leisure 
time, have relatively easy access to education and vari-
ous sources of  information, engage in non-manual and 
well-paid work, and live in cities or suburbs. A higher 
living standard enables people to participate in politics, 
and therefore, turnout should be higher in advanced so-
cieties (e.g. Powell 1982). However, some authors have 
pointed out that the relationship between socioeconom-
ic development and turnout rates is not linear. While 
the level of  development is theoretically unconstrained, 
voter turnout is limited by an upper bound, i.e. 100%. In 
light of  this difficulty, it appears to be more appropriate 
to model the relationship by using a logarithmic func-
tion (Norris 2002).  
4. Data and methods
We restrict the analysis to countries included in the 
third module of  the CSES for which all the variables used 
in the models below (i.e. variables of  interest and con-
trols) are available. Given this reduction of  the original 
dataset, 34,440 respondents from 27 countries are uti-
lized for modeling the effects of  independent variables 
on voting.6 The dataset is characterized by a hierarchi-
cal structure: at the first level (micro level), individuals 
are settled. These individuals are nested in the countries 
that constitute the second level (macro level) of  the anal-
ysis. Due to this structure, multilevel modelling with 
logit link function (the response is binary) is employed 
to estimate the impact of  the predictors of  voter turn-
6 Elections included in the analysis (number of  respondents in 
parenthesis) are Australia 2007 (1873), Brazil 2010 (2000), Czech 
Republic 2010 (1857), Germany 2009 (2095), Denmark 2007 (1442), 
Estonia 2011 (1000), Finland 2011 (1298), France 2007 (2000), Greece 
2009 (1022), Croatia 2007 (1004), Israel 2006 (1200), Japan 2007 
(1373), South Korea 2008 (1000), Mexico 2009 (2400), Netherlands 
2010 (2153), Norway 2009 (1782), New Zealand 2008 (1149), Poland 
2007 (1817), Slovakia 2010 (1203), Slovenia 2008 (1055), Sweden 
2006 (1547), Romania 2009 (1403), Canada 2008 (4495), Peru 2011 
(1570), Philippines 2010 (1200), Turkey 2011 (1109), and the United 
States 2008 (2102). It covers 44,149 respondents in total. However, 
because of  missing values, only 34,440 respondents are included in 
the empirical analysis below. It is also worth noting that in several 
countries (Brazil, Germany, Iceland, Mexico, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic), the third module of  the CSES was administered twice. 
This analysis takes into account only the newer survey.   
out (Gelman/Hill 2007; Hox 2010; Rabe-Hesketh/Sk-
rondal 2012). The major advantage of  multilevel models 
is their ability to combine characteristics from the micro 
level with those from the macro level, assuming that the 
variation in the dependent variable comprises two parts, 
within- and between-group components.
The dependent variable, participation in an election, 
is observed at the first level. In our dataset, it gauges self-
reported turnout mainly in parliamentary elections held 
from 2006 to 2011.7 When comparing the aggregate lev-
els of  electoral participation as declared by the respond-
ents in the survey with the actual turnout rates from the 
database of  International IDEA8 (see Appendix A), it is 
notable that the results of  the analysis portray a rather 
rough picture of  how the explanatory variables actually 
influence electoral participation (see Sigelman 1982).9
Our research strategy is based on the sequential de-
velopment of  a multilevel model. We start with the so-
called null model, i.e. a model in which no independent 
variables are included, to demonstrate the ratio of  with-
in- and between-group components of  variance in the 
dependent variable. In the second step, we add the set 
of  explanatory variables from the individual level. For 
us, a sense of  external efficacy is the pivotal factor at the 
micro level. Unfortunately, it is necessary to point out 
that the concept of  political efficacy is burdened by the 
voluminous discussion of  how to measure it (e.g. Craig/
Maggiotto 1982; Craig/Niemi/Silver 1990; Acock/Clarke 
1990). Since there is no consensus about the objective 
measurement of  efficacy, of  course, this work may be 
easily criticized for its operationalization and doubt-
ful validity.10 Like Karp and Banducci (2008) or Norris 
7 There are several exceptions: In Romania and in the Philippines, 
presidential elections are taken into consideration. In Brazil, Peru, 
and the United States, the survey reflects the intersection between 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The different importance 
of  elections is reflected in the models through the variable called 
electoral salience.
8 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
likely administers the most extensive global database of  turnout 
rates after World War II.
9 We attempted to overcome this difficulty by weighting the cases 
according to actual turnout. Given the overestimation of  self-
reported turnout (see Appendix A), non-voters received a weight 
higher than 1, while voters’ weight was designed to be lower than 
1 (the exact number for each country followed from the degree of  
overestimation of  self-reported turnout, i.e. from the proportion 
between actual and self-reported turnout). Since the statistical 
package (Stata 11, xtmelogit command) employed for the analysis 
does not allow data weighting in multilevel models, weights were 
applied on the series of  fixed effects models (i.e. models that include, 
in addition to the set of  individual and contextual-level predictors, 
dummy variables for particular countries, and thus allow the 
intercept to vary across contexts; see Brooks 2008: 493-494). The 
outcome of  fixed effects models was nearly the same as in multilevel 
models without weighting. For this reason, in the empirical section, 
only multilevel models are introduced. The fixed effects models are 
presented in Appendix C. 
10 Apparently, the most common measure of  a sense of  political 
efficacy is the four-item agree-disagree scale that includes following 
statements: (1) Sometimes politics and government seem so 
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(2004), we associate a sense of  external efficacy with the 
CSES item: “Some people say that no matter who people 
vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. 
Others say that who people vote for can make a big dif-
ference to what happens. Using the scale on this card 
(where one means that voting won’t make any difference 
to what happens and five means that voting can make a 
big difference), where would you place yourself?”
For Karp and Banducci (2008: 319), the question ask-
ing respondents to evaluate the meaningfulness of  vot-
ing is the most direct measure of  evaluations of  efficacy 
of  the vote available. These authors also stress that it is 
strongly associated with other measures of  external ef-
ficacy, and “therefore, there is clear evidence that the 
CSES item measures an aspect of  external efficacy.” (ibid: 
footnote no. 38).
Aside from our key individual-level variable, the 
model is enriched by several measures of  personal re-
complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s 
going on; (2) Voting is the only way that people like me can have a 
say about how the government runs things; (3) I don’t think public 
officials care much what people like me think; and (4) People like me 
don’t have any say about what the government does (e.g. McPherson 
et al. 1977). The first two items are usually perceived as measures 
of  internal efficacy, and the latter two items should indicate one’s 
external efficacy (Balch 1974; Converse 1972). 
sources, motivation, and mobilization (Verba et al. 1995). 
Personal resources are represented by basic socio-de-
mographic variables, i.e. age and education.11 From an 
array of  motivational characteristics, in addition to ex-
ternal efficacy, we control for party identification, satis-
faction with democracy and campaign involvement. The 
aspects of  mobilization for participation are included 
through marital status and union membership. Because 
voting is often perceived as a habit, participation in a 
previous election is put into the models as an explana-
tory variable.
Subsequently, we allow the effect of  external efficacy 
to vary randomly across countries. Since the analysis 
below documents that in some countries, a sense of  ex-
ternal efficacy does not have a significant impact on self-
reported turnout, while in others it does, it is legitimate 
to search for context-level forces that might be respon-
sible for the variation in the size of  this effect. In the pre-
vious paragraphs, we have attempted to describe that in 
the first place, democratic maturity might moderate the 
effect of  external efficacy. This variable is derived from 
the Polity IV. Project. The value for each country cor-
11 In our models, gender was not significant. Household income was 
not included due to a large number of  missing values. 
Variable Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual level
Vote DUM (1 = voted) .87 .34 0 1
External efficacy CON 3.95 1.20 1 5
Age CON 47.25 16.99 20 90
Education DUM (1 = tertiary) .27 .44 0 1
Party identification DUM (1 = identified) .52 .50 0 1
Satisfaction with democracy DUM (1 = satisfied) .60 .49 0 1
Campaign involvement DUM (1 = followed) .57 .49 0 1
Marital status DUM (1 = married) .64 .48 0 1
Union membership DUM (1 = member) .17 .37 0 1
Previous election DUM (1 = voted) .83 .38 0 1
Contextual level
Democratic maturity CON (ln) 3.62 .90 1.95 5.34
Electoral salience CON (2 = highest) 1.70 .58 0 2
Compulsory voting DUM (1 = yes) .17 .37 0 1
Closeness of election CON 7.96 5.84 .7 24
PR DUM (1 = PR) .56 .50 0 1
GDP per capita CON (ln) 10.04 .83 7.67 11.26
Data sources: CSES III, Polity IV. Project, Parties and Elections in Europe, and Adam Carr’s Election Archive. N = 34,440 (nested in 27 countries). CON – con-
tinuous; DUM – dummy variable.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
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responds with the number of  years the democracy has 
functioned without any interruption. In this study, we 
associate the starting point of  a democracy with the mo-
ment a particular state has reached or exceeded a Polity 
Score of  +7.12 Such a threshold was chosen based on the 
work of  Jaggers and Gurr (1995: 474), which asserts that 
political regimes with scores of  +7 to +10 are “coherent” 
democracies. Before the analysis, however, it was neces-
sary to transform this variable. We symmetrized its dis-
tribution using logarithmic transformation.
Naturally, we also make an effort to include context-
level controls into our hierarchical model. In addition 
to democratic maturity, the effects of  electoral salience, 
compulsory voting, closeness of  election (i.e. victory 
margin), proportional electoral system and the loga-
rithm of  GDP per capita are added.13 A detailed descrip-
tion of  all the variables utilized in the empirical analysis 
is available in Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of  these 
characteristics are introduced in Table 1.
The conclusion regarding whether the impact of  ex-
ternal efficacy is contingent on democratic maturity is 
based on an assessment of  the interaction between both 
variables of  interest. The joint effect of  these variables 
is included in the model in the last step of  the analysis. 
The interaction effect is calculated as a product of  the 
variables that should theoretically influence each other 
(Kam/Franzese 2007). The discussion below, in particu-
lar, elaborates whether the contingent effect of  demo-
cratic age is sufficiently strong enough to be significant.
5. Empirical analysis
The following paragraphs reflect the outcome of  multi-
level models in which self-reported turnout is regarded 
as a response. In this section, we present five models. 
We start with the empty or null model (without any ex-
planatory variables) and move to the more complicated 
random-intercept random-slope model that includes 
cross-level interaction (see Table 2). From the null model 
(Model 0), the justification for using hierarchical models 
can be derived. Given the value of  the intraclass corre-
lation coefficient (ICC), nearly 24 percent of  the varia-
tion in individual-level self-reported turnout can be at-
tributed to forces at the contextual level, and therefore,
12 The Polity score is a measure enumerated through the merging 
of  two composite measures, the indicators of  democracy and 
autocracy. Both of  these are gauged on an eleven-point scale (0 to 
10). The final score is computed by the subtraction of  the autocracy 
score from the democracy score. The value +10 depicts the most 
democratic regime and -10 the most autocratic regime (Marshall et 
al. 2011; Gurr 1974). 
13 Some other context-level factors, e.g. the human development index 
or the effective number of  legislative parties, were not significant 
in any of  the models, and therefore, they were excluded from the 
analysis.   
single-level logistic regression does not appear to be the 
proper statistical technique in this case.
When individual-level covariates are added (Model 
1), noticeable changes in values that characterize how 
the model fits the data, log likelihood (LL) and Bayes-
ian information criterion (BIC), are evident. This finding 
implies that micro-level factors make the model much 
more accurate compared to the null model. As can be 
seen, the effect of  external efficacy on declared turnout 
is positive and highly significant. Those who feel more 
strongly that their vote can make a big difference in what 
happens appear to be thus more likely to vote than less 
efficacious people.
In addition to external efficacy, the effects of  all indi-
vidual-level controls with the exception of  age14 are also 
statistically significant. Therefore, there is empirical 
evidence that voting should be more widespread among 
the highly educated, those who feel close to any politi-
cal party, those who are satisfied with the functioning 
of  a democracy, and those who have followed the pre-
election campaign closely. The probability of  visiting a 
polling place seems to be also higher when one is mar-
ried and/or declares membership in a union. Finally, 
the outcome of  Model 1 indicates that voting may be 
perceived to be a habit, because those who reported par-
ticipation in a previous election should have nearly five 
times higher odds of  casting a ballot compared to those 
who did not.15
In light of  the preceding sections of  this paper, we 
could suppose that the impact of  external efficacy will 
not be equal in all contexts. According to this expecta-
tion, the variation in the effect of  external efficacy has 
been allowed in Model 2. An LR test (not reported in Ta-
ble 2) has confirmed that the addition of  such random ef-
fect has brought a significant improvement of  the mod-
14 Although not significant at the 0.10 level, the effect of  age was 
not excluded from the analysis. The reason is twofold. First, in 
multilevel models, it was very close to being significant at the 0.10 
level. Second, in fixed effects models (see Appendix C), which can 
be perceived as a “pre-test” of  our hypothesis, the effect of  age was 
significant.
15 Since the interpretation of  β-coefficients is not completely reader-
friendly, odds ratios are often used for a description of  the results. 
Odds ratios are calculated as exp(β). The odds ratios higher than 1 
denote a positive association between independent and dependent 
variables. Nevertheless, due to varying intercept, in multilevel 
models, the interpretation must be cautious. For example, let us 
focus on the β-coefficient near previous election in Model 1. The 
β-coefficient (β
PRE
 = 1.602) implies that its odds ratio will be OR
PRE
 = 
exp(1.602) = 4.963. Given this odds ratio, we can say that for citizens 
who are situated in the same country (i.e. holding random intercept 
constant), it is expected that odds of  voting for those who cast a 
ballot in previous election are nearly five times higher compared to 
those who did not. In addition, we should also reflect that the model 
fit is not perfect at all. Therefore, we prefer not to interpret exact 
numbers of  the coefficients in this section. A detailed description of  
the effect of  previous election should serve as an instruction of  how 
these coefficients may be interpreted (when the model fit is almost 
perfect).
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el.16 Thus, it appears that the influence of  one’s efficacy 
on self-reported turnout actually varies across countries 
and the fixed effect (βEFF = .237 in Model 2) can be regard-
ed only as an average estimated impact that does not 
give complete information of  how external efficacy mat-
ters. When considering the variance in its random effect 
(σ2EFF = .016), we can state that the size of  estimated effect 
of  external efficacy fluctuates roughly in the range of  
.237 ± .252, i.e. from -.015 to .489.17 Thus, there are many 
16 Since we are not able to assess the significance of  the random effect 
of  external efficacy directly from Model 2 (as can be seen, there are 
no asterisks near the random effect), we must use some alternative 
test – in our case, the LR test was chosen – to evaluate whether 
this effect improves the model to the extent that it is adequate to 
include it. The LR test is based on the comparison of  the deviances 
(calculated as -2LL) of  two multilevel models where the first (less 
parsimonious) model enriches the second (more parsimonious) by 
one or more parameters. The difference in deviances is confronted 
with the critical value of  the chi-square distribution with the number 
of  degrees of  freedom corresponding with the number of  extra 
parameters. In our analysis, thus, Models 1 and 2 are compared. The 
difference in their deviances is 50.76. Since two extra parameters 
were added (the variance of  the random effect of  external efficacy 
and the covariance of  random intercept and random slope that 
is not reported in Table 2), the value is compared with the critical 
value of  the chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of  freedom. At 
the 5 percent significance level, its critical value is 5.99. Since the 
difference in deviances exceeds the critical value of  the chi-square 
distribution, it can be concluded that the random effect of  external 
efficacy has improved the model significantly.
17 As noted above, the variance in the random effect of  external efficacy 
was estimated in Model 2 (σ2EFF = .016). Accordingly, its standard 
deviation can be easily calculated (σEFF = .126). We assume that the 
effect varies randomly across countries, and hence, it should be 
countries where the effect should be positive, but there 
are also some contexts characterized by no association 
between external efficacy and declared turnout.
We are also able to depict graphically how the effect 
of  external efficacy varies across countries. As docu-
mented through the approximate calculation of  the ef-
fect fluctuation using the basic knowledge on normal 
distribution, in some countries, the estimated effect of  
external efficacy tends to be highly positive, while in 
others it is not significant. Figure 1 shows the effects of  
external efficacy for particular countries. In seven of  
twenty-seven countries (Peru, Croatia, Brazil, United 
States, New Zealand, Australia, and Denmark), the 95 
percent confidence interval contains null, which signi-
fies that external efficacy has no or only minimal impact 
on voting. The remaining twenty contexts show a posi-
tive association between external efficacy and self-re-
ported turnout, which, based on the theory, is commonly 
expected. The highest impact of  external efficacy is esti-
mated in Central European countries (Germany, Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia) and northern Europe (Norway 
and Sweden). 
We must admit that, at first glance, it appears that 
the countries that show the lowest as well as the highest 
impact of  external efficacy do not resemble each other 
normally distributed. In the normal distribution, about 95 percent 
of  the values lie within two standard deviations of  the mean (2σEFF 
= 2 x .126 = .252). That is why the effect of  external efficacy across 
countries was estimated using the interval .237 ± .252. 
Data source: CSES III. Aside from the estimated effect of external efficacy, the 95% confidence interval is displayed. 
Figure 1. The effect of external efficacy on self-reported turnout by country
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according to their levels of  democratic maturity. The 
first group of  contexts, i.e. those with no impact of  ex-
ternal efficacy on the decision whether to vote, includes 
states in which democracy is very well established – for 
instance, democratic rule has persisted for more than 
100 years in the United States, New Zealand, and Aus-
tralia – alongside countries that have experienced dem-
ocratic transition only a few years ago (Peru and Croa-
tia). In the second category of  countries, i.e. the states 
in which external efficacy should influence voting most 
significantly, high variation in democratic age also oc-
curs. To demonstrate these differences, we can take Swe-
den, which has been considered a democratic system for 
almost ninety years, and compare it with such countries 
as the Czech Republic or Slovakia in which democracy 
has begun to develop just after 1989. Notwithstanding, 
in the last two stages of  the analysis, we strive to ascribe 
cross-national variation in the effect of  external efficacy 
on democratic age. 
Before that, however, one might speculate what as-
pects of  the context can stay beyond the fact that in the 
first group of  countries, efficacious people vote roughly 
to the same degree as those who do not feel external ef-
ficacy, while in the remainder, such people participate 
more in elections. Except for Croatia and the United 
States, the group of  countries that shows no significant 
impact of  external efficacy on voting is characterized by 
very high turnout rates (see Appendix A). In addition, 
Australia, Brazil, and Peru have laws for compulsory 
voting. Because it is a mathematical fact that when turn-
out tends toward 100%, people of  all kinds vote in the 
same proportions (see Tingsten 1937; Gallego 2015), we 
could imagine that to a certain extent, the non-signif-
icant effect of  a sense of  external efficacy is caused by 
high levels of  voter turnout.18
In contrast, the countries, in which external efficacy 
matters most for the decision regarding whether to vote, 
differ considerably in their levels of  actual turnout (from 
82% in Sweden to 59% in Slovakia), and hence, the spec-
ulative explanation presented above cannot be applied. 
But these states share another characteristic relevant 
for political behavior – electoral systems that generate 
relatively proportional outcomes. To this, we must add 
that electoral system and external efficacy are inter-
connected concepts: since fewer votes are wasted under 
PR (compared to majoritarian) systems, the use of  this 
electoral formula may contribute to the belief  that every 
18 When thinking about the remaining two countries, other 
explanations may be suggested. In the United States, for example, 
the non-significant effect of  external efficacy on self-reported 
turnout might be caused by large population size, which decreases 
the motivation of  efficacious people to go to the polls. In Croatia, an 
authoritarian legacy (which persisted until Franjo Tuđman’s death 
in 1999), together with the war of  independence, may represent two 
main reasons why efficacious people voted to the same degree as the 
inefficacious.  
single vote is important for a political contest (e.g. Geys 
2006; Bühlmann/Freitag 2006). In these contexts, thus, 
efficacious citizens may have a strong incentive to cast a 
ballot, which results in greater gaps in turnout rates be-
tween efficacious and inefficacious people.
So far, the role of  context in the models has been 
perceived as rather indefinite, expressed by random 
intercept and random slope (and therefore, some spec-
ulative explanations have been discussed).19 Through 
the inclusion of  context-level factors into the model, 
Model 3 attempts to specify the impact of  forces from 
the contextual level that might be responsible for the 
variation in random effects. In this model, the direct ef-
fects of  six variables are added. For us, however, the key 
contextual variable is democratic maturity. Its effect on 
self-reported turnout is positive and highly significant 
(β
MAT
 = .865). This finding implies that citizens who live 
in long-established democracies are more prone to vote. 
From context-level controls added into the model, we 
can note that the voting decision may depend to a cer-
tain extent on factors such as compulsory voting, victory 
margin, and a state’s economic performance.20 The new-
ly added factors, not surprisingly, are responsible for a 
substantial decrease in the variance in the constant (it 
has dropped from 1.123 to .630).
We wish to emphasize that this study primarily has 
sought to assess the contingent effect of  context, or more 
precisely, democratic maturity. Although Figure 1 has 
not fully demonstrated that the variation in the effect 
of  external efficacy might be driven by democratic age 
(see above), we have added a cross-level interaction term 
linking external efficacy to democratic maturity into the 
model. The outcome of  Model 4, which is the least par-
simonious, signifies that the impact of  external efficacy 
can be truly contingent upon the age of  the regime. Al-
though significant only at the .10 level, the estimate of  
the interaction term (β
EFF x MAT 
= .064) provides support 
for our initial expectation (i.e. the higher the democratic 
maturity, the higher the positive effect of  external effi-
cacy on propensity to vote). 
Let us interpret this interaction in detail. At the low-
est level of  democratic maturity, the effect of  external 
19 While the random intercept indicates that due to various aspects 
of  the contexts (i.e. context-level variables), the probability of  
voting in some countries is higher than in others, random slope is 
used to demonstrate that due to context-level forces, the effect of  
individual-level variables on propensity to vote is not equal across 
countries. But the previous models do not specify these context-
level forces at all. When appropriate contextual variables are added, 
the variance in the effect of  external efficacy should be decreased, 
because the indefinite role of  the context acquires “the true face.” The 
inclusion of  contextual variables should also reduce the variance in 
the constant, which relates to the direct impact of  the context on 
voting.
20 In the fixed effects models, the impact of  electoral salience and 
proportional electoral system was also significant (see Appendix C), 
and therefore, both context-level controls have been included in the 
multilevel models.
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efficacy is not significant (β
EFF | MAT0
 = .027).21 But as a 
democratic regime matures, the impact becomes highly 
positive. For example, when a democracy has functioned 
for two decades, the coefficient of  external efficacy is at 
.219 (β
EFF | MAT3
 = .027 + 3 x .064 = .219).22 When a regime is 
even more stable, say 55 years, the coefficient increases 
to .283 (β
EFF | MAT4
 = .027 + 4 x .064 = .283) and when the 
democracy has persisted for nearly 150 years, the coef-
ficient that expresses the impact of  external efficacy on 
self-reported turnout should be at .347 (β
EFF | MAT5
 = .027 + 
5 x .064 = .347). 
To portray the interaction graphically, we provide 
Figure 2 above. In addition to the effect of  external ef-
ficacy for different values of  democratic maturity, this 
figure shows a 95% confidence interval for the effect of  
external efficacy. As can be seen, within the whole inter-
val of  real values of  democratic maturity – in our dataset, 
its logarithm varies from 1.94 to 5.34 (see Table 1), which 
21 For instructions on how to interpret interaction terms, see e.g. Kam 
and Franzese (2007). In Model 4, the coefficient β
EFF | MAT0
 can be 
seen next to the effect of  external efficacy. This coefficient no longer 
expresses the direct effect of  external efficacy on propensity to vote, 
but rather its effect when democratic maturity is equal to 0 (it is 
reflected through the mark of  the coefficient where the condition 
MAT0 is attached).
22 Since the variable that expresses democratic maturity has been 
logarithmized, at first, we must translate its values to the original 
form. Thus, the value of  3 corresponds with 20 years with a coherent 
democracy (ln 20 = 3), the value of  4 with 55 years, and the value of  5 
with 148 years. 
corresponds to the interval of  the values from 7 to 208 
years – the effect of  external efficacy on self-reported 
turnout appears to be significant (the 95% confidence 
interval does not contain zero). Given this result, we can 
conclude that there is certain empirical evidence that 
democratic maturity may influence the decision wheth-
er to vote not only directly, but it is also able to change 
the size of  the effect of  some individual-level variables 
– in our case, a sense of  external efficacy – on self-re-
ported turnout.23 
6. Concluding remarks
Voting occupies a special place in the analysis of  politi-
cal participation. By a substantial margin, it is the most 
common way in which citizens may influence the politi-
cal process (e.g. Dalton 2014). In light of  the principle 
“one person, one vote,” it embodies one of  the funda-
mental democratic principles – political equality. But 
voter turnout in many countries worldwide is surpris-
ingly low and often declining (see Mair 2002; Norris 
2002; Franklin 2004 etc.). Hence, the question of  why 
some people cast a ballot while others do not has become 
very compelling. 
23 Another source of  support for the contingent effect of  democratic 
age is presented in fixed effects models (see Appendix C), where the 
interaction term is positive and highly significant.
Data sources: CSES III and Polity IV. Project.  95% confidence interval is displayed.
Figure 2. The relationship between democratic maturity and country effects of external efficacy on self-reported 
 turnout
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There are many sophisticated responses related to 
this question, and their discussion undoubtedly exceeds 
the scope of  this paper. This study has focused only on 
the impact of  two factors, a sense of  external efficacy 
and democratic maturity, whose importance stems from 
the expectation that they might be related to each other. 
Given their interconnection, we have sought to assess 
not only their direct effects on self-reported turnout, but 
also whether the effect of  the former varies according to 
the level of  the latter. We have hypothesized that due to 
variation in the nature of  political socialization, the pos-
itive effect of  external efficacy on voting should increase 
as a democracy matures. To test this contingent effect 
of  democratic age on external efficacy, we have utilized 
multilevel logistic regression models. 
The outcomes of  the empirical analysis have dem-
onstrated that those who feel efficacious are more likely 
to vote than those who do not. However, the impact of  
external efficacy does not appear to be uniform across 
contexts. There are those countries in which its effect on 
self-reported turnout was estimated to be close to null, 
and thus not significant, but at the same time, some oth-
er countries have shown highly a positive and signifi-
cant effect of  external efficacy.
Of  course, the cross-national variance in this effect 
might be ascribed to many context-level factors. Our 
study has emphasized the role of  democratic legacy. To 
a certain extent, there is empirical evidence that demo-
cratic maturity can influence the probability of  casting 
a ballot not only directly, but also contingently, i.e. as an 
amplifier of  the impact of  a sense of  external efficacy. 
The results of  the analysis have shown that in emerging 
democracies, those who feel efficacious vote in roughly 
same proportion as those who do not. But as a democ-
racy matures, the difference in the proportions of  voters 
between these two groups increases. From this point of  
view, the analysis provides certain support for the initial 
hypothesis of  this paper. Accordingly, we may speculate 
that a sense of  external efficacy has a different nature in 
older and newer democracies. While in the former, its 
acquisition straightforwardly leads to active participa-
tion in elections, in the latter, it more likely expresses the 
fact that people are aware that they possess, compared 
to the situation in the preceding undemocratic regime, 
an opportunity to influence politics. This non-uniform 
character of  external efficacy in people’s minds results 
primarily from different political socialization and the 
role of  the agents of  this process.  
However, these outcomes must be evaluated with 
care. After restriction of  the dataset, only twenty-seven 
countries have been examined, which is not a very high 
number for multilevel modeling. We have been forced to 
remove several states due to missing values; in the re-
mainder, very rough data were sometimes utilized (for 
example, consider the country gaps in actual and self-
reported turnout in Appendix A). There is also the ubi-
quitous problem of  omitted-variable bias as well as the 
difficulty that concerns the operationalization of  con-
cepts and the transformation of  the variables. All these 
aspects of  our work signify that the results are more or 
less distorted.  
Despite these and many other facts (e.g. Van der Meer 
et al. 2010), we believe that this paper contributes to the 
body of  literature on voter turnout. It deepens know-
ledge about how context matters and demonstrates that 
a comprehensive explanation of  one’s voting decision 
should not be frozen in the simple logic of  direct effects. 
Here, some way to move beyond such a position has been 
offered. Although the results of  the analysis are not ab-
solutely satisfactory, it seems that the path we have cho-
sen does not lead down a blind alley. 
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Appendix A: Proportion of people that voted in twenty-seven countries
Appendices
Data sources: CSES III and International IDEA. Actual turnout is measured as a proportion of registered voters who cast a 
ballot. When the intersection between parliamentary and presidential elections occurs, the figure shows actual turnout in 
parliamentary elections. 
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Appendix B: Variables included in the analysis




C3021_1 (The wording follows national standards) 1 – voted, 
0 – not voted
External efficacy C3005 Some people say that no matter who people 
vote for, it won’t make any difference to what 
happens. Others say that who people vote for 
can make a big difference to what happens. 
Using the scale on this card (where one means 
that voting won’t make any difference to what 
happens and five means that voting can make 
a big difference), where would you place 
yourself?
1 – who people vote for will not 
make any difference, 5 – who 
people vote for can make a big 
difference
Age C2001 – Years
Education C2003 – 1 – tertiary, 0 – others (primary, 
vocational training, secondary)
Party identification C3020_1 Do you usually think of yourself as close to any 
particular party?




C3019 On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in 
(country)?
1 – satisfied (very or fairly satisfied), 
0 – not satisfied (not very satisfied 
or not at all satisfied)
Campaign 
involvement
C3018 How closely did you follow the election 
campaign? Very closely, fairly closely, not very 
closely, or not closely at all?
1 – closely followed (very closely 
or fairly closely), 0 – not closely 
followed (not very closely or not 
closely at all)
Marital status C2004 – 1 – married or living together as 
married, 0 – others
Union membership C2005 – 1 – member, 0 – non-member
Previous election C3031 (The wording follows national standards) 1 – voted,
0 – not voted
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Variable CSES item Question wording / description Values after transformation
Contextual level
Democratic maturity – The number of years through election analyzed 
in the survey during which a democracy scored 
+7 to +10 in Polity score without any interruption
Natural logarithm of years
Electoral salience C1015, C5054 The variable measures how much was at stake in 
the election that concerns the CSES survey
2 – highly salient election 
(parliamentary election in 
parliamentary regime, presidential 
election in presidential regime, 
simultaneous elections in 
parliamentary or presidential 
regime), 1 – mean salient election 
(parliamentary or presidential 
elections in mixed regime), 0 – 
lowly salient election (presidential 
election in parliamentary regime, 
parliamentary election in 
presidential regime)
Compulsory voting C5044 – 1 – yes (the law states that those 
who have the right to vote are 




– Victory margin (i.e. the difference in vote shares 
between the winning party/candidate and the 
second most successful party/candidate)
The percentage of victory margin 
(calculated from the databases of 
Parties and elections in Europe and 
Adam Carr’s election archive)
PR C5058 The use of proportional electoral system 1 – yes, 0 – no
GDP per capita C5081_1 The indicator of state’s economic performance 
in the election year
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita
Data sources: CSES III, Polity IV. Project, Parties and Elections in Europe, and Adam Carr’s Election Archive.
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